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ABSTRACT
This paper introduces a labor force participation choice into a labor market matching model
embedded in a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium set-up with production and savings. The
participation choice is modelled as a tradeoff between forgoing the expected benefits of being search
active and engaging in costly labor market search. The model induces a symmetry in firms’ and
workers’ search decision since both sides of the labor market vary search effort at the extensive
margins. We show that this set-up is of considerable analytical convenience and that it gives rise to
a linear relationship between labor market tightness and the marginal utility of consumption. We
refer to the latter as the “consumption - tightness puzzle” because (a) it gives rise to a number of
counterfactual implications, and (b) it is a robust implication of theory.  Amongst the counterfactual
implications are very low volatility of tightness, procyclical unemployment, and a positively sloped
Beveridge curve. These implications all derive from procyclical variations in participation rates that









This paper analyzes the properties of a Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), Pissarides
(2000) style labor market matching model extended with a labor market participation
choice embedded in a stochastic growth model. The bulk of modern business cycle
theories assume instantaneous and costless matching of employers and workers, see
e.g. Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992), Hansen (1985), or Prescott (1986). Labor
market matching models instead realistically assume that it takes time and resources
to match ﬁrms wishing to ﬁll job vacancies with workers looking for jobs. This
labor market matching process introduces frictional unemployment and it places the
labor market in a central role in the transmission of shocks over time and across
agents. Therefore, it is not surprising that this framework, which has proven extremely
successful as a tool for understanding the long-run determinants of unemployment
(see e.g. the review of Ljungqvist and Sargent, 2005), is receiving growing interest in
the business cycle literature see e.g. Andolfatto (1996), Cheron and Langot (2004),
den Haan, Ramey and Watson (2000), Gertler and Trigari (2005), Hall (2005), Merz
(1995) and Shimer (2005).
In the Mortensen-Pissarides set-up, the labor market matching process is modelled
on the basis of a matching function that relates the number of new job matches to the
number of search active unmatched agents and to the number of job vacancies posted
by ﬁrms. When deciding upon the number of job vacancies to post, ﬁrms consider
the costs of setting aside resources to open a job vacancy relative to the expected
beneﬁts that a successful job match produces. Thus, on the part of ﬁrms, matching
models allow for variations in the extensive search margin.
On the part of workers instead, most applications of matching / search theories
in the business cycle literature assume that the labor market participation rate is
constant. Therefore, variations in the extensive search margin occur only through
changes in the net-hiring rate (the diﬀerence between the number of new job matches
and the termination of existing job-worker relationships). This assumption might
seem natural given that the labor market participation rate does not vary much
over the business cycle. We argue that this latter argument is misleading on sev-
eral grounds. First, consistently with the theory that we propose, US labor market
participation rates display procyclical movements. Secondly, it is important to un-
derstand whether the relatively low volatility of the participation rate is consistent
with economic theory. Third, in order to ask whether theory can account for the em-
pirically observed moments of unemployment, the measurements of unemployment
in the data and in theory need to be consistent and this requires one to introduce a
participation choice. Finally, and this is a main contribution of this paper, we show
that the matching model extended with a participation choice provides a series of
strong predictions for indicators that are central in labor market matching models
and for variables that are at the heart of business cycle research.
We assume that in order to participate in labor market activities, agents need
to give up leisure which enables them to search for a job. In return, consistently
with Flinn and Heckman (1983), search active agents face a potentially more favor-
able labor market outcome than non-participants. In particular, we assume that
the matching probability of the former group of agents is higher than the matching
1probability of the latter group. Therefore, the participation choice is based upon
the trade-oﬀ between giving up leisure to be search active vs. the expected (extra)
beneﬁts of being search active.
We are by no means the ﬁrst to introduce a participation choice into models of
labor market search and/or labor market matching. Burdett et al (1984) analyze
and estimate a three state labor market search model with a participation choice,
see also Bowlus (1997). Andolfatto and Gomme (1996) study a search model with a
participation choice in order to analyze the eﬀects of labor market policies. Following
Pissarides (2000), a number of papers have analyzed matching models with a partic-
ipation choice. Garibaldi and Wasmer (2005), Haefke and Reiter (2006), Pries and
Rogerson (2004) and Yip (2003) all analyze dynamic search models with a participa-
tion choice in which shocks to the value of non-participation relative to participation
generates ﬂows in and out of the labor market. Each of these papers examine models
without savings and assume incomplete markets. The current paper instead intro-
duces production and savings. As argued by Hall (2006), savings and self-insurance
are key when accounting for the search incentives of the unemployed. We assume
complete markets since this gives rise to a much simpler framework than the more
complicated incomplete markets settings. Furthermore, it appears that the complete
markets setting emulates very well the main properties of the, perhaps more realis-
tic, incomplete markets self-insurance model, see Hall (2006). Moreover, our analysis
allows for risk aversion and we show that this is a key parameter. Similar complete
markets settings have been analyzed by Veracierto (2003) and by Ravn (2005). Ve-
racierto (2003) introduce a labor market participation choice into a Lucas-Alvarez
type (island) search model with production and savings assuming complete markets.
Ravn (2005) estimates a more complicated version of the model that is analyzed in
the current paper. The main innovation of the current paper relative to Veracierto
(2003) and Ravn (2005) is that we are able to derive a simple and robust relation-
ship between labor market tightness and consumption that appears to have been
overlooked in previous research.
The model that we study introduces a symmetry between ﬁrms’ and workers’
search activities since both sides of the labor market vary their search eﬀorts at the
extensive margin. This symmetry is shown to have important consequences and, sur-
prisingly, turns out to be of considerable analytical convenience. When allowing for
variations in the labor market participation rate, the ﬁrst-order condition for house-
holds’ search intensity along the extensive margin resembles the more familiar vacancy
posting condition that derives from the ﬁrms’ problem. In particular, variations in
households’ search intensity along the extensive margin equalize the marginal costs
of search (the utility value of the loss of leisure) with the expected marginal beneﬁto f
labor market search which is the product of the probability that labor market search
produces a match and the marginal beneﬁt of being employed.
When this insight is combined with the assumption that wages are determined
according to a (post-match) Nash bargain, it implies a linear relationship between
labor market tightness and the marginal utility of consumption, a result that we refer
to as the “consumption - tightness puzzle”. This allows us to fully characterize the
cyclical variations in labor market tightness on the basis of the cyclical variations in
consumption. Therefore, a great advantage of our analysis is that we derive a simple
2testable relationship which does not depend upon the source of shocks to the economy
nor on the persistence of these shocks.
We frame this relationship a puzzle for the following reasons. First, it implies
very low volatility of the vu−ratio (or extreme volatility of consumption) since the
standard deviation of the logarithm of the vu−ratio should equal the standard devi-
ation of the logarithm of consumption times the curvature of the marginal utility of
consumption. The latter is the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion (or the inverse of
the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, the IES) and standard estimates of this
parameter are small and values above 5 are usually claimed to be implausible. In
contrast, in U.S. quarterly data, the standard deviation of the vu−ratio is around 20
times higher than the standard deviation of consumption at the business cycle fre-
quencies. Thus, theory can account for maximum 25 percent of the observed volatility
of the vu−ratio. Said diﬀerently, the model implies procyclical unemployment since
vacancies are not only slightly more procyclical than realistic measures of the mar-
ginal utility of consumption, but also display much higher volatility. Alternatively,
this latter insight insight can be formulated in terms of the slope of the Beveridge
curve, which is positive in the model but negative in the data.
The intuition for why the matching model with an extensive search margin im-
plies a positive correlation between unemployment and vacancies is straightforward.
Consider a situation in which ﬁrms decide to post more vacancies. This increases
households’ payoﬀ from labor market participation since, for a given unemployment
rate, the probability that a job search results in a job-match increases. Therefore,
there will be a positive correlation between vacancies and labor market participation.
Moreover, since higher unemployment, all other things given, increases the returns
from posting job vacancies, ﬁrms react by increasing job vacancies. This mechanism
introduces a positive correlation between unemployment and vacancies unless the
variations in labor market tightness are related to large (inversely signed) variations
in the marginal utility of consumption and we argue that the latter is empirically
implausible. This positive correlation between unemployment and vacancies also ex-
plains why the volatility of labor market tightness is low.
We show that these insights are robust. We study four extensions of the model.
First we introduce an intensive search margin. We assume that agents can vary their
search eﬀort but that higher search eﬀort is costly. We show that this extension
leaves the consumption - tightness puzzle unaltered for plausible parametrizations of
the search eﬀort costs. Next, we introduce home-production. In this set-up the par-
ticipation choice is a trade-oﬀ between forgoing the beneﬁts of labor market search
and giving up the resources generated by home-production. This implies a modiﬁca-
tion to the relationship between consumption (of market goods) and tightness but we
argue that it might possibly worsen the consumption - tightness puzzle. The reason
is that the implied relationship no longer depends on the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution of consumption.
The ﬁnal two extensions alter the assumptions on the matching framework. We
ﬁrst allow for “passive search”, i.e. for the possibility that non-participants might be
matched with a job vacancy despite not actively searching for a job. This set-up is
potentially consistent with the fact that there are substantial ﬂows from out-of-the-
labor-force to employment. This extension does address the consumption- tightness
3puzzle because there is less incentive to become search active when non-participation
also allows agents to ﬁnd jobs. Nevertheless, for realistic assumptions regarding the
size of ﬂows into employment from unemployment and from non-participation, the
consumption - tightness puzzle is approximately unchanged. In the second setting
we assume that the matching technology is duration dependent. In particular, we as-
sume that unemployed workers might be faced with either an eﬃcient or an ineﬃcient
matching technology where the latter is associated with a smaller matching proba-
bility than the former. This set-up gives rise to a relationship between consumption
and an altered version of tightness deﬁned as the ratio of vacancies to the measure of
search active workers faced with the ineﬃcient matching function (who are on average
longer term unemployed). In this case we leave it open whether duration dependence
is important for the consumption - tightness puzzle because it is hard to match the
implied measure of unemployment with oﬃcial unemployment statistics.
A key aspect of the labor market matching model with an extensive search mar-
gin is that the participation rate should be procyclical (positively correlated with
consumption). Such procyclical movements in the participation rate can actually be
observed in U.S. data. In particular, the secular rise in the participation rate that
has occurred in the U.S. over the last 60 years slowed down in each of the recessions
dated by the NBER Business Cycle Dating Committee. Furthermore, we show that
there exists a positive correlation between consumption and the participation rate at
the business cycle frequencies. However, participation rates lag around a year after
consumption and the elasticity of the participation rate to consumption is very low.
We argue that future research need to look into the reasons for why labor market
participation, although procyclical, vary little over the business cycle.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the basic
model and derives the main result on the relationship between consumption and
labor market tightness. Section 3 extends the basic set-up to include, in turn, an
intensive search margin, homework, passive search, and duration dependent matching
functions. Section 4 discusses the implications for variations in participation rates.
Finally, Section 5 concludes and summarizes.
2T h e M o d e l
We study a stochastic optimal growth model combined with a labor market match-
i n gm o d e l i n go ft h el a b o rm a r k e ta k i nt oA n d o l f a t t o( 1 9 9 6 )a n dM e r z( 1 9 9 5 ) . W e
introduce a participation choice modelled as a trade-oﬀ between forgoing the oppor-
tunity of ﬁnding a job and the cost of giving up leisure in order to engage in labor
market search activities. We show that introducing the extensive search margin (the
participation choice) has fundamental implications.
2.1 Preferences and Technology
There is a measure one of households. Households consist of a continuum of agents
and it is assumed that households pool the idiosyncratic labor market risk of their
members. At any point in time a measure nt of the household members are em-
4ployed and earn labor income, a measure ut are non-employed but search active, and
a measure (1 − nt − ut) are out of the labor force. Unemployment is measured by the
second group of agents. Thus, consistently with the measurement of U.S. unemploy-
ment, we deﬁne unemployed agents as being characterized by (i) not being matched
with an employer, but (ii) actively searching for a job.
Employed household members supply lt hours of work and, as in the labor hoarding
model of Burnside and Eichenbaum (1996), there is a ﬁxed leisure cost s ≥ 0 of
engaging in labor market activities. Non-employed search active household members
also face the ﬁxed cost s of participating in labor market activities. Non-participants
instead enjoy their entire time endowment as leisure.
The period utility function of a household member is given as:
u(cit,e it)=G(cit)+H (eit) (1)
where cit denotes consumption and eit denotes leisure given labor market status i =
n,u,l.W ed e n o t eb yi = n that the household member is employed, by i = u that
the household member is unemployed, and by i = l that the household member is
not participating. The time-endowment is normalized to one unit. It follows that
ent =1− lt − s, eut =1− s,a n delt =1 .
The ﬂow utility of a representative household is then given as:
u(ct,e t)=G(ct)+ntH (1 − lt − s)+utH (1 − s)+( 1− nt − ut)H (1)
Here we have used the risk sharing principle which, due to separability of pref-
erences, implies that each household member consumes the same amount of goods
regardless of their labor market status.
The sub-utility functions G and H are assumed to be increasing and strictly
concave. We restrict G(ct) to be of the form G(ct)=c
1−η
t /(1 − η) for η>0 and η 6=1
or G(ct)=l n ct. The parameter 1/η is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution






where Et denotes the expectations operator conditional on information available at
date t,a n dβ<1 is the subjective discount factor.
Firms with vacancies and unemployed workers meet randomly in an anonymous
matching market. Matches are formed according to the following matching function:
mt = M (vt,u t) (2)
where mt is the measure of new matches between a measure of ut unemployed workers
and vt vacant jobs in period t. The function M is assumed to be increasing and
concave in each of its arguments, and to be homogeneous of degree one in vacancies
and unemployment jointly. Given the constant returns assumption, we can express
the matching function as:
mt = utϕ(θt)
5where θt = vt/ut is the ratio of vacancies to unemployment, and ϕ(θt) ≡ M (θt,1).
Thus, the probability that a search active worker ﬁnds a job vacancy, γh
t = mt/ut =
ϕ(θt), is an increasing function of θt while the probability that a job vacancy is
m a t c h e dw i t ha nu n e m p l o y e dw o r k e r ,γ
f
t = mt/vt = ϕ(θt)/θt, is a decreasing function
of θt. It follows that γh
t/γ
f
t = θt. Hence, it is clear that the vu−ratio, aka labor market
tightness, is a key variable since it determines the matching market prospects of ﬁrms
and workers.
The matching technology above assumes that non-participants do not receive any
job oﬀers.1 We later examine the consequences of allowing for “passive search” as
well, i.e. assuming that job oﬀers might arrive at non-participants.
Each period ﬁrms and employed households face an exogenously given probability
that their match is terminated. This probability is given by σt ∈ [0;1].T h u s , t h e
transition equation for employment is given as:
nt+1 =( 1− σt)nt + utϕ(θt) (3)
We assume that the job-separation rate follows an autoregressive process:
lnσt+1 =( 1− ρσ)lnσ + ρσ lnσt + ε
σ
t+1 (4)
where ρσ ∈ (−1;1), σ>0 denotes the unconditional mean of σt, εσ
t+1 is assumed to
be normally and independently distributed over time with mean 0 and variance vσ.
Output is produced using inputs of labor (the product of employment and hours
worked per employee), ntlt,c a p i t a l ,kt, and is subject to stochastic productivity
shocks, zt. We assume that ﬁrms take capital rental rates, rt, and the price of output
(the numeraire) for given. As in Andolfatto (1996) we assume that ﬁrms have a
number of diﬀerent jobs that may either be ﬁlled, posted in the vacancy market, or
dormant. If ﬁrms decide to post a vacancy it must pay a resource cost κ>0 per
vacancy per period. In equilibrium, ﬁrms determine the optimal number of vacancies
by maximizing their proﬁts taking into account the costs and beneﬁts of vacancy
postings. The ﬁrms are owned by the households and their proﬁts are paid out to
the households as dividends.
The production function is speciﬁed by:
yt = f (kt,n tlt,z t) (5)
which we assume satisﬁes the Inada conditions, is increasing and strictly concave in kt
and in ntlt, and homogeneous of degree one in (kt,n tlt). The process for productivity
shocks is assumed to be stationary but possibly persistent:
lnzt+1 =( 1− ρz)lnz + ρz lnzt + ε
z
t+1 (6)
where ρz ∈ (−1;1), z>0 denotes the unconditional mean of z,a n dεz
t+1 is assumed
to be normally and independently distributed over time with mean 0 and variance vε.
The capital stock evolves over time according to the standard neoclassical speci-
ﬁcation:
kt+1 =( 1− δ)kt + it (7)
1Bowlus (1997) makes the same assumption in a search model as do Haefke and Reiter (2006).
6where δ ∈ (0,1) denotes the depreciation rate, and it is gross investment.
The resource constraint of the economy is then given by:
yt ≥ ct + it + κvt (8)
We assume that wages are determined according to a standard Nash bargaining
over the joint match surplus of a worker-job pair. We let ϑ denote the bargaining
weight of the workers. We do not impose the Hosios (1990) condition since our results
will hold regardless of this eﬃciency consideration.
We will now derive the implications of this model on the basis of the competitive
search equilibrium. Given the recursive structure of the model, we remove time indices
and use the notation x0 to denote the next period value of the variable x.
2.2 The Households’ Problem
The maximization problem of the representative household can be formulated on the
basis of the following Bellman equation:
J (k,n)= m a x
(c,k0,u,n0)
{c
1−η/(1 − η)+nH (1 − l − s)+uH (1 − s)




0 ≤ (1 − δ + r)k + wnl + π (10)
n
0 =( 1 − σ)n + γ
hu (11)
J (k,n) denotes the representative households’ value function which depends on
its holdings of capital and the share of the household members that are employed.2
We use the notation Ex0 to denote the expectation of x0 conditional on all available
current information (including the transition laws for the exogenous shocks and the
aggregate state variables). Equation (10) is the budget constraint which states that
total spending on consumption (c) and capital for the next period (k0)c a n n o te x c e e d
the sum of the value of its remaining capital stock (k − δk), rental income from capital
(rk),l a b o ri n c o m e(wnl), and the dividends received from its ownership of the ﬁrms
(π).
Equation (11) is the households’ employment transition function. It relates the
share of household members that are employed next period (n0) to this period’s em-
ployment (n) corrected for net new employment. The latter is given by the number
of new job-worker matches, γhu, less the separations of currently employed household
members from their jobs, σn. Importantly, individual households take the matching
probability, γh,f o rg i v e n .
The ﬁrst-order conditions for c, k0, u,a n dn0, in that order, are given by:
c
−η = λc (12)
λc = βEJk0 (k
0,n
0) (13)
H (1) − H (1 − s)=γ
hλn (14)
λn = βEJn0 (k
0,n
0) (15)
2We simplify the notation slightly for presentational purposes. The state variables of the house-
holds include also the aggregate capital stock, aggregate employment, and the stochastic variables,
z and σ.
7and the envelope conditions are:
Jk (k,n)=λc (1 − δ + r) (16)
Jn (k,n)=λcwl +( 1− σ)λn + H (1 − l − s) − H (1) (17)




0)=H (1) − H (1 − s) (18)
Equation (18) is key. The right hand side of this expression is the utility loss
associated with a marginal change in the share of household members that are search
active rather than non-participating. This utility loss comes from the fact that search
active agents need to spend time on search activities that non-participants instead
enjoy as leisure. The left hand side of the expression is the expectation of the change
in the value of employment produced by a marginal change in the number of search
a c t i v eh o u s e h o l dm e m b e r s .T h i si sg i v e nb yt h ep r o b a b i l i t yt h a tas e a r c ha c t i v ea g e n t
i sm a t c h e dw i t hav a c a n c y ,γh, times the expected marginal value of employment next
period, EJn0, discounted at the rate of β.
Combining (18) with (17) g i v e su st h a t :







0−η +( 1− σ
0)
H (1) − H (1 − s)




This is similar to the more familiar vacancy creation condition (which we derive
below). It sets the “cost” of labor market search equal to the expected beneﬁts.
The latter consists of the sum of the (utility value of the) marginal increase in labor
income and the future search costs savings less the utility value of the loss of leisure
associated with working rather than enjoying the entire time-endowment as leisure.
2.3 The Firms’ Problem
Bellman’s equation for the ﬁrms’ problem is given as:
Q(n)=m a x







0 =( 1 − σ)n + γ
fv (21)
where Q(n) is the value of a ﬁrm with n ﬁlled jobs. The objective function consists
of the current proﬁt ﬂow, π = F (k,nl)−wnl−κv−rk plus the discounted expected
future value. The maximization takes place subject to the job transition function
which links the future number of ﬁlled jobs to the current stock of ﬁlled jobs plus
net hiring where the latter is the diﬀerence between new hires, γfv, and exogenous
terminations of current jobs, σn.
The ﬁrst order conditions for this problem can be formulated as:








8and from the envelope condition it follows that:





















Condition (22) equalizes the rental rate of capital with the marginal product of
capital. Equation (23) is the condition for the optimal number of vacancy postings.
The latter sets the vacancy posting cost, κ, equal to the expected discounted value
of posting a vacancy which is given by the probability that a vacancy results in a




uc. The value of ﬁlling a vacancy, in turn, is the sum of the marginal proﬁt (the
diﬀerence between the marginal product of a hire and the marginal wage cost) plus
the expected future vacancy posting cost savings. Combining these expressions gives
us the condition for vacancy postings given in (25).
2.4 Wages
Wages are determined by ex-post (after matching) Nash bargaining. This implies that
employers and workers share the joint match surplus according to their bargaining
power. Let ϑ ∈ (0;1) denote the ﬁrms’ bargaining power and let Sn denote the joint
match surplus. The match surplus is given as:
Sn = Qn (n)+
1
c−ηJn (k,n)
and the surplus is divided so that:
ϑJn (k,n)=c
−η (1 − ϑ)Qn (n) (26)
where Qn and Jn were derived above. Evaluating condition (26) for the next period








This condition simpliﬁes using the ﬁrst order conditions from the households’ and
the ﬁrms’ problems. In particular, we have that:
(1 − ϑ)βE
c0−η





H (1) − H (1 − s)
γh c
η




H (1) − H (1 − s)
γh c
η (27)
9which is the key relationship that we discuss below.
Using these we can then derive the equilibrium wage bill per employee as:
wl =( 1− ϑ)Fn + ϑc
η [H(1) − H (1 − l − s)]
which determines the wage as a weighted average of the marginal product of em-
ployment and the utility weighted leisure cost of working rather than enjoying the
endowment as leisure.
2.5 The Consumption - Tightness Puzzle
We can now derive the key result which is summarized by the following proposition:
Proposition 1 In the competitive search equilibrium, independently of the source of







where ω is a constant given by [H (1) − H (1 − s)]/κ.
Proof. The result follows simply from re-arranging condition (27) using that γh/γf =
(m/u)/(m/v)=θ.
This equation summarizes in a simple way the central implications for variations in
unemployment and vacancies in the labor market matching model with an endogenous
participation choice. As we will show below, the relationship implies (a) low volatility
of the vu-ratio, (b) a strong tendency for procyclical movements in unemployment and
for (c) a positively sloped Beveridge curve. Before we show these results it is worth
pointing out that the relationship between labor market tightness and consumption
derived above does not depend on the stochastic processes for job separation shocks
and technology shocks and neither does it depend on the absence of capital adjustment
costs nor on the production technology.
Table 1 reports some selected moments of US aggregate output and labor market
variables at the business cycle frequencies. We present moments of quarterly data
for the sample period 1964-2004. In order to isolate the movements in the relevant
variables at the business cycle frequencies, the data were detrended with either the
Hodrick and Prescott (1997) ﬁlter or with the Baxter and King (1999) approximate
band-pass ﬁlter.3 We examine the properties of aggregate output, aggregate con-
sumption, aggregate hours worked, aggregate unemployment, and vacancies all as
ratios of the US civilian non-institutional population. The table also reports the
moments of the vu−ratio. Consumption is measured as US private sector consump-
tion of non-durables and services. Hours worked are aggregate hours worked in the
non-farm part of the economy. Unemployment is the total number of unemployed
persons as reported by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Vacancies are measured on the
3As is standard in the business cycle literature, we use a value of 1600 for the smoothing parameter
in the Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter. For the Baxter-King ﬁlter we use an MA-length of 12 quarters and
the cut-oﬀ frequencies are chosen as 6 quarter and 32 quarters, respectively.
10basis of an index of “help wanted” advertisements.4 The table reports the percentage
standard deviations of these variables and some selected cross-correlations.
In the US, unemployment is strongly countercyclical and very volatile. At the
business cycle frequencies, the standard deviation of unemployment is close to 11
percent per quarter, or more than 7 times higher than that of output (9 times that of
consumption). The contemporaneous correlation between unemployment and output
is close to −0.90. Vacancies are even more volatile than unemployment (its standard
deviation is above 13 percent per quarter) and display very procyclical behavior at the
business cycle frequencies (the correlation between vacancies and output is above 90
percent). The strong negative contemporaneous correlation between unemployment
and vacancies that forms part of the classic Beveridge curve relationship then implies
high volatility of the vu−ratio (its standard deviation is 16 times that of output, or
around 20 times that of consumption) and a contemporaneous positive correlation
with output in excess of 0.90.
Consistently with (28), the vu−ratio and consumption are positively correlated
(the cross-correlation is approximately 80 percent in the US data). Figure 1 illustrates
consumption plotted against the vu−ratio for the two detrending methods. The ﬁgure
clearly visualizes the positive correlation between them. The R2 measure of ﬁti sa s
high as 60 percent and 62 percent for Hodrick-Prescott ﬁltered data and Baxter-King
ﬁltered data, respectively.
However, for realistic degrees of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, theory
can account for only a small fraction of the observed volatility of the vu−ratio. Notice
that (28) implies that regressing the (logarithm of the) vu−ratio on (the logarithm
of) consumption should give an estimate of the inverse of the IES, or alternatively,
that the standard deviation of the vu−ratio implied by the model is equal to the
inverse of the IES times the standard deviation of consumption. The slopes of the
regression lines in Figure 1 imply estimates of the inverse of the IES equal to 14.8 and
15.3, respectively, for the two panels of Figure 1. The ratio of the standard deviations
instead imply values of η of 19.2 and 19.5 for Hodrick-Prescott ﬁltered and Baxter-
King ﬁltered data, respectively. These estimates are far above the values of η normally
considered realistic. Estimates by Eichenbaum, Hansen and Singleton (1988), Friend
and Blume (1975), Neely, Roy and Whiteman (2001), and many others, indicate that
realistic estimates of η are in the range of 0.5-3 (see Mehra and Prescott, 2003, for
an extensive discussion). Said diﬀerently, for standard values of the IES, using the
observed volatility of consumption, the model can account for only a small fraction
(less than 25 percent) of the volatility of the vu−ratio.5
Another way of expressing these insights is in terms of the covariance implications.
In particular, for realistic second moments of vacancies and consumption, the labor
market matching model implies pro-cyclical unemployment. To see this, note that
4Table A.1 reports the deﬁnitions and sources of the data.
5The model can easily be extended to include productivity growth. In this case the condition
in (28) is still valid but relates the vu−ratio to consumption relative to the level of productivity.
Therefore one may wonder whether the calculations should not relate the level of the vu−ratio to
detrended consumption. Following this strategy, however, implies even higher and more unrealistic
estimates of η. F o rB a x t e ra n dK i n gﬁltered consumption, forexample, the slope of the regression
lines implies a value of η of 20 and the ratio of standard deviations of the vu−ratio and consumption
gives a value of 40 for η.






Taking logarithms gives us that:
cor(b u,b c)=







where b x denotes ln(xt).
Suppose the model would be able to reproduce the empirical estimates of the
moments of the data that enter on the right hand side of this expression. In this
case, using the estimates in Table 1, the cross-correlation between unemployment and
consumption would equal approximately 0.99−η/10.6 T a k i n gav a l u eo fη in the upper
end of the empirically plausible estimates, η =3 ,i m p l i e st h a tcor(b u,b c)=0 .69.I nU S
data instead, this correlation is −0.70,s e eT a b l e1 .T h e r e f o r e ,e v e ni ft h em o d e lc o u l d
reproduce the correlation between vacancies and consumption and the variances of
consumption, vacancies and unemployment, it would require very large and unrealistic
values of η to account for the countercyclical movements in unemployment observed
in the data.
In order to visualize the extent to which the actual and implied unemployment
rates diﬀer, Figure 2 plots the actual unemployment rate against the unemployment
rate implied by the above relationship for η =1(a realistic value) and for η =1 0 (an
unrealistically high value) on the basis of HP-ﬁltered US data. In both case, there is
as t r o n gnegative association between the actual and implied unemployment rate
The intuition for the tendency for procyclical unemployment is straightforward.
In this model, while employment is predetermined, unemployment is not a state vari-
able since households can adjust the number of agents that are search active through
variations in the participation rate. An increase in vacancies increases the expected
payoﬀ from labor market search since the probability of being matched with a va-
cancy rises. Therefore, the participation rate increases which leads to a tendency for
procyclical unemployment. This eﬀect is moderated only by the extent to which the
underlying shock lowers the marginal utility of consumption (which lowers the payoﬀ
from search activities). The latter eﬀect, however, is only quantitatively important
when the curvature of the utility function is very large and we argue that plausible
estimates of the IES imply moderate curvature. Therefore, ﬂuctuations in vacancies
tend to induce equally signed ﬂuctuations in unemployment through variations in
the participation rate. In other words, the Beveridge curve is - counterfactually -
positively sloped when we allow for a participation choice.
In sum, once one allows agents to choose whether to be search active or not,
the labor market matching model gives rise to a consumption-tightness puzzle in the
sense that unrealistically high degrees of risk aversion (low degrees of intertemporal
elasticity of substitution) are required to account for (a) the volatility of the vu−ratio,
and (b) the countercyclical movements in unemployment (and a negatively sloped
Beveridge curve).
6To get this expression express cor(b u,b c) as (var(b v)/var(b u))
1/2 cor((b c,b v)) −
η(var(b c)/var(b u))
1/2. Inserting the estimates on the basis of the HP-ﬁltered data in Table
1 implies the formula in the text.
123E x t e n s i o n s
We now examine a number of extensions of the basic model in order to gauge the
robustness of the consumption-tightness puzzle highlighted in the previous section.
A sw ew i l ls h o w ,t h eq u a l i t a t i v ef e a t u r e so ft h er e s u l t sa b o v ea r er o b u s t .
3.1 Variable Search Eﬀort
The ﬁrst extension introduces variable search intensity into the above model. We
assume that, for given levels of unemployment and vacancies, when more resources
are spent on job search, more matches will be produced between unemployed workers
and ﬁrms with vacant jobs. As in Merz (1995), higher search eﬀort is assumed to give
rise to a resource cost.7 Allowing for variable search eﬀort may therefore moderate
the results above since the tendency for households to devote more resources to search
activities when vacancies rise can also be achieved through variations in the intensive
search margin.
With variable search eﬀort, the matching technology is given as:
mt = M (vt,h tut)
where ht denotes search eﬀort. We assume that the matching technology displays
constant returns to (vt,h tut) jointly. Thus, the probability that a search active worker
ﬁnds a job vacancy, mt/ut = htφ(θt/ht), is an increasing function of θt and ht.
We assume that higher search eﬀort (along the intensive margin) gives rise to a
resource cost, d(ht) per search active household member. The economy’s resource
constraint now reads:
yt ≥ ct + it + κvt + utd(ht)
where d is an increasing and convex function.
The ﬁrst-order necessary conditions for the households’ problem (see Appendix 1








where γh = m/(uh).
This condition states that, in the optimum, marginal search costs equal the prob-
ability that a new match is formed times the marginal value of a match. Combining
this equation with the households’ ﬁrst-order condition for the choice of u implies
that:
H (1) − H (1 − s)=c
−η [ψ(h) − 1]d(h) (30)
where ψ is the elasticity of d(h), ψ(h)=( ∂d(h)/∂h)(h/d(h)). Thus, if the elas-
ticity of the search eﬀort costs is constant, c−η and d(h) will be perfectly negatively
7Search eﬀort therefore has the interpretation of costs of ﬁlling in job applications, travelling to
job interviews etc. Alternatively, one can assume that search eﬀorts give rise to leisure costs, see
eg. Andolfatto (1996). However, the latter modelling implies that search eﬀort is constant in the
optimum (see the next footnote) and is therefore less interesting for our purposes.
13correlated. In other words, under these conditions search eﬀort will be positively
correlated with consumption no matter the source of shocks to the economy.8
After some algebra, we can show that when we allow for variable search eﬀorts at








This expression diﬀers from the one derived under assumption of constant search
eﬀort only by the term ψ(h)/(ψ(h) − 1) that appears on the left hand side. When
ψ(h) is constant, the model with variable search eﬀort therefore delivers exactly the
same predictions regarding the volatility of the vu−ratio and the cyclical features of
unemployment as the model with constant search eﬀort.
3.2 Homework
Next we consider an extension of the basic model with homework (see e.g. Ben-
habib, Rogerson, and Wright, 1991).9 This extension modiﬁes the trade-oﬀ between
labor market search and non-participation since agents now have the opportunity of
spending part of their time-endowment on home production.
Agents consume two types of goods: market goods (cm) a n dg o o d sp r o d u c e di n
the home-sector (ch). Both goods are produced using inputs of capital and labor and
are subject to productivity shocks. Goods produced in the home-sector are used for
consumption only.
Per capita hours supplied to the home-sector are given as
μ = nμn + uμu +( 1− n − u)μl
where μn denotes hours worked at home of an employed worker, μu hours worked
at home of an unemployed household member, and μl hours worked at home of a






where ch is the consumption of home-goods, x denotes the fraction of the aggregate
capital stock that is used for production in the market sector. zh are temporary pro-
ductivity shocks to the home-production technology which we assume are generated
by a ﬁrst-order autoregressive process with innovations that are possibly correlated
8Merz (1995) also ﬁnds procyclical search intensity in a standard labor market matching model
without the participation choice. Her result is derived on the basis of the impulse responses in a
numerically solved version of the model. For the Andolfatto (1996) speciﬁcation of leisure costs of
search eﬀort we would assume that d(h)=0and that xu =( 1− h − s). This implies, however,
that optimal search eﬀort is constant since the ﬁrst-order condition for h can be expressed as:
−∂H(1 − h − s)/∂h =[ H (1) − H (1 − h − s)]/h which involves only h and constants. Therefore
the optimal h is constant.
9Garibaldi and Wasmer (2005) also introduce homework into a matching framework with a
participation choice. Cooley and Quadrini (1999) include homework in a matching framework with
limited asset market participation.
14with the innovations to z. We assume that g is increasing and concave in (1 − x)k
and in μ, and that it is homogeneous of degree one in ((1 − x)k,μ) jointly.
The period utility function is given as:
u(c,ei)=c
1−η/(1 − η)+H (ei)
where en =1− s − l − μn, eu =1− s − μu,a n del =1− μl. c is an aggregate of the
consumption of the two goods:
c = C (cm,c h)
We assume that C is increasing, concave, and homogeneous of degree 1. Finally,
the resource constraint for the market sector now reads:
cm + k
0 + κv ≤ f (xk,nl,z)+( 1− δ)k (33)
The households’ problem can now be expressed as choosing sequences of con-
sumption, capital stocks, hours worked in the home sector, the share of search active
agents, and the division of capital between sectors to solve:
J (k,n)= m a x
(c,n0,k0,u,μi,x)
{c
1−η/(1 − η)+nHw (1 − l − s − μn)+uHu (1 − s − μu)
+(1− n − u)Hn (1 − μl)+βEJ (k
0,n
0)} (34)
subject to the constraints:
cm + k
0 ≤ (1 − δ + rx)k + wnl + π
n






The ﬁrst-order conditions are described in detail in Appendix 2. A key implication












Notice that the right hand side of this expression does not depend on the labor
market status. Therefore, under the condition that H is strictly concave, it follows
that:
μl = μu + s = μn + l + s (35)
In other words, leisure does not depend on labor market status. Thus, agents that
are non-participants compensate for their lack of hours devoted to market activities
by working s more hours at home than agents that are search active, and s+l hours
more at home than agents that are employed. This reﬂects risk sharing: the marginal
disutility of work is equalized across agents (that diﬀer by their labor market status).
We follow Gomme, Kydland and Rupert (2001) and assume that the consumption





h ,ξ∈ (0;1) (36)







h ((1 − x)k)
τ μ
1−τ,τ∈ (0;1) (37)
We can now derive the following result:
15Proposition 2 In the homework economy with a Cobb-Douglas consumption aggre-
gator and Cobb-Douglas home-production function, the vu−ratio and consumption of









ξ (1 − τ) s
κ.
Proof. Using that μl = μu+s = μn+l+s,t h eﬁrst-order conditions for the optimal













whereequation (35) implies that μl−μu = s.U s i n g(37) we have that
∂g((1−x)k,μ,zh)
∂μ =
(1 − τh)ch/μ and from (36) it follows that ∂c
∂ch/ ∂c
∂cm =( 1− ξ)/ξ (cm/ch). Inserting
these gives (38)
This relationship diﬀers from (28) in two ways. First, it no longer involves the risk
aversion parameter, η. Secondly, the relationship involves also the number of hours
supplied to the home-sector, r. Potentially the latter aspect might help addressing
the consumption-tightness puzzle. In particular, a negative covariance between con-
sumption of market goods and hours supplied to the home sector induces volatility in
the vu−ratio. Most models with home production do indeed imply strongly counter-
cyclical movements in hours supplied in the home sector (see e.g. Gomme, Kydland
and Rupert, 2001).
Quantitatively, however, even a substantial negative covariance between consump-
tion of market goods and homework hours is unlikely to help much in explaining the
gap between the observed volatility of the vu−ratio and that implied by the growth
model with labor market frictions and a participation choice and the model therefore
still has a strong tendency for procyclical movements in unemployment and for a
positive contemporaneous correlation between unemployment and vacancies. To see
this, consider the following calculation. The standard deviation of Hodrick-Prescott
ﬁltered (per capita) hours worked in the market sector is around 1.75 percent per
quarter in the U.S. (see Table 1). The volatility of hours worked in the home sector
is unlikely to be higher than this. Thus, even if consumption of market goods and
hours worked in the home sector were perfectly negatively correlated, the implied
standard deviation of the vu−ratio, would be no higher than 2.59 percent, around
10 times lower than the standard deviation of the vu-ratio in the U.S. data.10 For
the same reasons, the model with homework implies a positive correlation between
unemployment and vacancies and procyclical unemployment.
T h e r e f o r ew ec o n c l u d et h a tt h ei n t r o d u c t i o no fh o m e w o r kd o e sn o ti m p a c to nt h e
consumption - labor market tightness puzzle; On the contrary it may even worsen.
10To get this number, assuming a Cobb-Douglas matching technology, it follows from (38) that the




r − 2cov (c,r)
¢1/2
.A s s u m i n g
that cov (c,r)=−σcσr, and using the values for σc and σr from Table 1 for the Hodrick-Prescott
ﬁlter data gives the number in the text.
163.3 Passive Search
The matching technology analyzed so far assumes that non-participants do not receive
any job oﬀers. However, in U.S. data there are substantial ﬂows from out-of-the-labor-
force directly into employment, see e.g. Davis, Faberman and Haltiwanger (2006) for
a recent review. For this reason, Andolfatto and Gomme (1996), Pries and Rogerson
(2004), and Yip (2003), for example, assume that wage oﬀers might be received by
both unemployed workers and by non-participants.11
We now extend the model of Section 2 by allowing for “passive search”. We
assume that the aggregate matching function is given as:
mt = M
u (vt,u t)+M
l (vt,1 − nt − ut)
We will assume that mu
t/ut ≥ ml
t/(1 − nt − ut) in order to be consistent with the
observation that the matching frequency of unemployed workers is much higher than
the matching frequency of non-participants. This assumption also squares well with
Flinn and Heckman’s (1983) ﬁnding that unemployment helps facilitate job search
relative to non-participation.
The households’ problem is given as:
J (k,n)= m a x
(c,k0,u,n0)
{c
1−η/(1 − η)+nH (1 − l − s)+uH (1 − s)




0 ≤ (1 − δ + r)k + wnl + π (40)
n




2 (1 − n − u) (41)
where (41) now takes into account that non-participants as well as unemployed house-
hold members might become matched. In this equation we deﬁne γh
1 = mu/u and
γh
2 = ml/(1 − n − u).
The ﬁrms’ problem is unchanged (apart from the change in the probability that a
vacancy is ﬁlled). Going through the same steps as in Section 2 gives us the following
condition:
θ
u +( 1− n) mu
m






which is identical to (28) apart from the ratio
u+(1−n)mu
m
1−n−u that appears on the left hand
side. Notice that this ratio is equal to 1 when mu/m =1as we assumed in Section
2. When mu/m approaches 0 instead, this ratio becomes equal to u/(1 − n − u).
In this case, the left hand side of (42) becomes equal to ratio of vacancies to non-
participation.
According to Fallick and Fleischman (2004), the mean ﬂow from non-employment
into employment is approximately equal to 4.6 millions in the United States and
the mean ﬂow from unemployment accounts for around 1.8 millions of these new job
ﬁndings. Thus, mu/m is approximately equal to 40 percent. Assuming that this ratio
is constant, we can then compute the left hand side of (42). Figure 3 illustrates the
11In principle, time-aggregation might account for the recorded ﬂows from out-of-the labor force
to employment even if non-participants have to become search active to ﬁnd a job match.
17implies standard deviation of (HP-ﬁltered values of) the left hand side of (42) for
alternative values of mu
m .W h e nmu/m approaches 0 the implied percentage standard
deviation of the left hand side is 13.2 which is 40 percent lower than the standard
deviation of tightness itself. However, when we set mu/m equal to its mean US
v a l u e ,t h ei m p l i e ds t a n d a r dd e v i a t i o no ft h el e f th a n ds i d eo f(42) is 21.2 which is
only marginally lower than the volatility of tightness. Therefore, while allowing for
“passive search” helps addressing the consumption-tightness puzzle, quantitatively
this feature does not appear to matter much because the left hand side of (42) is
insensitive to mu
m u n l e s st h i sr a t i ob e c o m e sv e r ys m a l l .
Therefore, we conclude that allowing for passive search is inessential for the results.
3.4 Duration Dependent Matching Functions
The previous Section analyzed a setting in which search active agents and non-
participants face heterogenous matching functions. An alternative modelling of this
feature is that unmatched agents diﬀer in their labor market prospects even when
search active. In particular, recently unemployed agents may face more eﬃcient
matching functions than longer term unemployed workers or out-of-the-labor-force.
We now analyze such a setting.
We assume that there are two types of unemployed workers that diﬀer in their
prospects of being matched with vacancies, “short-term unemployed” and “long-term
unemployed”. Long-term unemployed workers face a less eﬃcient matching technol-
ogy than the short-term unemployed and this group of agents may choose to become
non-participants. As in Section 2, we assume that only search active agents receive
job oﬀers.
The labor market ﬂow dynamics are as follows. Every period a fraction σ of
the currently employed worker-job matches are terminated and a measure M new
matches are formed. Workers that experience a termination of their matches, enter
into short-term unemployment.12 A short term unemployed household member may
either remain short term unemployed, become matched with a vacancy, or experience
a transition to long-term unemployment. We assume that the latter event occurs
with probability μ ∈ [0;1]. New matches are formed between vacant jobs and search
active unmatched agents but the number of matches depends now on both labor
market tightness and on the structure of unemployment.
Formally, we assume that the aggregate number of matches is given as:
M (v,u1,u 2)=m1 (v,u1)+m2 (v,u2)
m1 (v,u) >m 2 (v,u) for ∀v,u > 0
where u1 denotes the measure of short-term unemployed workers, and u2 the measure
of long-term unemployed.
The employment transition equation is now given as:
n
0 =( 1− σ)n + m1 + m2 (43)
12Strictly speaking, the use of the ‘long-term’ unemployment and ‘short-term’ unemployment is
misleading since the transition from the latter group to the latter group occurs independently of
the duration of unemployment. However, on average, the latter group will have experienced shorter
unemployment spells than the former.
18and the transition equation for short term unemployment is given as:
u
0
1 =( 1− φ)u1 + σn− m1 (44)
where φ is the probability that a currently short-term unemployed worker becomes
long-term unemployed.
Bellman’s equation for the households’ problem is given as:
J (k,n,u1)= m a x
(c,k0,u)
{c
1−η/(1 − η)+nH (1 − l − s)+( u1 + u2)H (1 − s)
+(1− n − u1 − u2)H (1) + βEJ (k
0,n
0,u 1)} (45)
w h e r ew en o t et h a ts h o r t - t e r mu n e m p l o y m e n ti sn o was t a t ev a r i a b l e .T h eB e l l m a n
equation is maximized subject to the constraints:
c + k
0 ≤ (1 − δ + r)k + wnl + π (46)
n











1 denotes the probability that a short-term unemployed search active household
member is matched with a vacancy and γh
2 is the equivalent probability for a long-
term unemployed worker.
In this model, the participation choice is relevant for long-term unemployed house-
hold members; Under mild conditions on γh
1 relative to γh
2, household members are
better oﬀ searching as long as they are faced with the more eﬃcient matching tech-
nology.





0)=H (1) − H (1 − s) (49)
This condition is equivalent to condition (18) d e r i v e di nS e c t i o n2a p a r tf r o m
the deﬁnition of the matching market prospect. The marginal value of employment,
however, now takes into account the multiple matching functions. It is given as:
Jn (k,n,u1)=c











This determines the marginal value of a job as sum of the utility value of the labor
income, the expected marginal value of being employed the next period times the
probability that the match survives (discounted one period), the expected marginal
value of short-term unemployment times the probability that the match is terminated,
less the utility value of the loss of leisure of working rather than enjoying the time




















1) − (H(1) − H (1 − s))
19A short term unemployed worker ﬁnds a job match with probability γh
1 which
gives her the value βEJn0 (k0,n 0,u 0
1); With probability
£




short-term unemployed worker is still unemployed next period giving her a value
βEJu0
1 (k0,n 0,u 0
1); Finally, being search active rather than non-participating gives rise
to a utility loss (H(1) − H (1 − s)) due to the search eﬀo r tt h a tm u s tb ee x e r t e d .
The ﬁrms’ problem is now given as:
Q(n)=m a x
k,v

















Notice that we assume that ﬁrms cannot target any of the two matching markets
individually. The ﬁrst-order condition for the choice of capital is identical to the




















It is important to notice that the relevant ﬁrst-order condition for households’
search eﬀorts at the extensive margin involves the probability that long-term un-
employed household members ﬁnd a job match while ﬁrms’ ﬁrst-order condition for
vacancy postings involve the probability of meeting any unmatched search active
worker. If possible, ﬁrms would prefer target vacancies at the matching market that
yields the highest possible probability of a match with an unemployed worker. This
possibility is, however, ruled out by assumption and this creates the wedge between
the relevant matching market ﬁrst-order conditions.
Wages are again determined by an ex-post Nash bargain. Following the same








ηH (1) − H (1 − s)
κ
(53)
where θ = v/(u1 + u2).
This relation is similar to the one derived in the previous sub-section (equation
(42)) since it implies a modiﬁcation to the appropriate measure of tightness. In the
current setting, the “consumption-tightness puzzle” involves the ratio of vacancies
to “long-term” unemployment rather than the standard deﬁnition of tightness that
enter equation (28).
If u2 is literally interpreted as “long-term” unemployment, this model leads to an
even bigger consumption - tightness puzzle than the model we analyzed in Section
2. The reason for this is that longer term unemployment is even more volatile than
overall unemployment. In Table 1 we report, for example, the moments of vacancies
to unemployment above 15 weeks of duration. The standard deviation of this ratio is
20around 35 percent per quarter which is 59 percent higher than the standard deviation
of tightness itself.
However, this calculation might be misleading for two reasons. First, u2 does
not directly measure long-term unemployment although the unemployment duration
of agents faced with the ineﬃcient matching technology will on average be longer
than the mean duration of agents faced with the more eﬃcient matching technology.
Secondly, the measurement of the duration of unemployment applied by the Bureau
of Labor Statistics deﬁnes the duration of unemployment as the length of “in-progress
spell of joblessness”. The duration of unemployment of a search active agent faced
with the ineﬃcient matching technology who was previously out of the labor force
will therefore be measured by the duration of the current job search rather than the
length of time since the last job match.
For these reasons, the measurement of u2 on the basis of longer term unem-
ployment might be misleading. In essence, u2 denotes the measure of agents that
despite being faced with a potentially quite ineﬃcient matching technology still ﬁnd
it worthwhile to be search active. It is not clear to match this measure up with the
data and we therefore leave it open whether duration dependence of the matching
market prospects is important for accounting for the consumption - tightness puzzle.
4D i s c u s s i o n
The analysis above has illustrated the robustness of the relationship between the
marginal utility of consumption and labor market tightness that we derived in Section
2. We now want to discuss some wider aspects of the result and its implications.
The low volatility of labor market tightness and procyclical movements in un-
employment derive from the variations in labor market participation. In the set-up
that we study, households optimally choose to increase labor market participation in
response to increases in labor market tightness. It is this mechanism that implies low
volatility of labor market tightness in equilibrium.13
Hence, it is clear that variations in the participation rate are key and that the
introduction of an extensive search margin leads to a strong tendency for procyclical
variations in labor market participation. Figure 4 illustrates the US labor market par-
ticipation rate from 1947 onwards. The ﬁgure clearly illustrates the secular increase
i nt h eU . S .p a r t i c i p a t i o nr a t e . I tr o s ef r o ma r o u n d5 8p e r c e n ti nt h el a t e1 9 4 0 ’ st o
approximately 67 percent by the 2000’s, an increase that is dominated by an increase
in the employment rate (from 56 percent to 64 percent).
Figure 4 also illustrates (with shaded areas) the recessions of the US economy
according to the NBER business cycle dating committee. The ﬁgure indicates that the
secular increase in the participation rate predominantly took place during periods of
high activity. In particular, the secular increase in the participation rate either slowed
down or was reversed during each of the recessions. Thus, consistently with the theory,
there appears to be some cyclical features of the movements in the participation rate.
13Notice, however, that the response of unemployment to vacancies may lead to high volatility of
vacancies itself.
21To examine this further, the last rows of the two panels of Table 1 report the
moments of HP-ﬁltered and BK-ﬁltered participation rates. The participation rate
is procyclical but displays low volatility at the business cycle frequencies irrespective
of the detrending method. In particular, relative to trend, the standard deviation of
the participation rate is around one fourth of the standard deviation of consumption
at the business cycle frequencies and the cross-correlation between these variables is
just below 30 percent.
Figure 5 illustrates in the top panel the HP-ﬁltered US data for consumption and
the participation rate. This illustrates quite clearly that the participation rate is
much smoother than consumption at the business cycle frequencies. The ﬁgure also
hints that there might be a phase-shift between consumption and participation rate.
In particular, with the exception of the late 1970’s, the participation rate appears to
lag the ﬂuctuations in consumption. The lower panel illustrates the cross-correlation
function between consumption and leads and lags of the participation rate. The
results indicate that the participation rate lags around 4 quarters after consumption.
Moreover, with a 4 quarter lag the cross-correlation is as high as 65 percent.
Nevertheless, despite this high correlation, the elasticity of the participation rate
to consumption is still estimated to be low. Using the estimates of Table 1, the
elasticity of the participation rate with respect to consumption is around 17 percent
(with a four quarter lag). Thus, even large cyclical ﬂuctuations in consumption are
associated with small variations in participation rates.
Similarly, Figure 6 illustrates the relationship between the vu−ratio and labor
market participation rates. The top panel shows the deviations from (Hodrick-
Prescott) trends of the vu−ratio and of the participation rate. Given the large
diﬀerence in their volatility, the vu−ratio is plotted against the left axis and the
participation rate against the right axis. Consistently with the model that we have
analyzed these two variables are clearly positively related. The lower panel shows the
cross-correlation function at leads and lags. As above, there is a substantial positive
correlation and it occurs with a lag (but slightly shorter than above). At a 2 quarter
lag (of the participation rate), the cross-correlation is close to 70 percent.
This suggests that perhaps the ﬁndings of this paper are related to costs of entering
and exiting the labor force. Such costs might explain why the participation rate moves
little in response to variations in the beneﬁts of job search and why the participation
rate appears to lag behind output and consumption over the business cycle. Such
costs also appear realistic for some parts of the agents that compose the out-of-
the-labor-force group. Young people under education or workers that have to move
geographically in order to search for a job, for example, might ﬁnd it costly to change
their labor market status. On the other hand, using a limited information approach,
Ravn (2005) estimates such costs to be very large in order to account for the labor
market movements over the business cycle which casts doubt on this aspect being the
sole explanation for the ﬁndings of this paper.
An alternative assumption adopted by e.g. Garibaldi and Wasmer (2005) and
Haefke and Reiter (2006) is that agents diﬀer in their evaluation of leisure (or in their
productivity in homework). This implies that the group of non-participants will be
heterogenous with respect to how close their valuation of non-participation is to their
valuation of labor market search. In particular, those agents that value leisure highly
22may ﬁnd it optimal to remain out of the labor force even for large increases in the
value of search. Through this mechanism, heterogeneity in the valuation of leisure (or
in home-productivity) can limit the tendency for procyclical movements in labor force
participation that we have derived in this paper. Nonetheless, this set-up appears
to be in contradiction with the large observed ﬂows of agents from non-participation
into employment (and into unemployment) that we discussed in Section 3.3 unless
there are large idiosyncratic shocks to preferences or home-productivity. We ﬁnd such
idiosyncratic preferences shocks hard to interpret.14
Therefore we ﬁnd it more promising to explore in more details the type of settings
that we studied in Sections 3.3 and 3.4. Here duration dependence and passive
s e a r c hj o i n t l yi m p l yt h a t( i )t h e r ei sl e s si n c e n t i v et oj o i nt h el a b o rf o r c ei nr e s p o n s e
to increases in the value of search, and (ii) some of the non-participants might ﬁnd
it unproﬁtable actively to search for a job not because they value leisure highly but
because they face little prospect of ﬁnding a job through active search.
5 Summary and Conclusions
An important line of research in business cycle theory has studied the eﬀects of
matching frictions in the labor market. This is an important development in business
cycle theory since ﬂuctuations in labor are key for understanding the business cycle,
see e.g. Kydland (1995). The matching frictions assumed in Mortensen-Pissarides
set-up places the labor market in a central role in the propagation of shocks over time
and across agents.
This paper has studied the eﬀects of introducing a labor market participation
choice. Surprisingly, we have shown that the introduction of a labor market partici-
pation choice is of considerable analytical convenience since it allows us to derive a
very simple testable relationship between labor market tightness and consumption.
Moreover, this relationship is robust to various extensions of the baseline model that
we proposed. The advantage of this result is that it involves only observable variables
and that gives rise to a relationship that does not depend on the properties of the
stochastic processes of exogenous variables.
A standard intuition from such labor market matching models is that unemploy-
ment, consistently with the data, behaves countercyclically as job matches increases
in good times when ﬁrms increase their investment in job hiring activities. This paper
has shown, however, that once one introduces an endogenous labor market partici-
pation choice, there is a strong tendency for procyclical behavior of unemployment.
The reason is that labor market non-participants have an incentive to enter the la-
bor market, i.e. become search active, when labor market prospects improve. These
procyclical movements in labor market participation rates imply low volatility of the
ratio of vacancies to unemployment and a positive slope of the Beveridge curve. Evi-
dently, in U.S. data, although participation rates do move procyclically, the elasticity
14A similar mechanism can be introduced into the set-up studied in the present paper by allowing
for shocks to the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption. Denoting such a
taste shock for ζt, the equivalent of equation (28) becomes θ = ϑ
1−ϑωζcη. A large variance of the
taste shock may therefore break the link between consumption and tightness.
23of the participation rate is very low.
Understanding better why this is the case is an important issue for further re-
search. There are various avenues open for addressing this. One possibility is to
introduce costs of entering and exiting the labor force. Another possibility is to
introduce some of the aspects that we examined in Section 3. It is possible that
when these features are joined and possibly combined with other extensions (such
as habit persistence, non-separable preferences, incomplete markets) that this will
yield a solution to the consumption - tightness puzzle. We will examine this in future
research.
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26Table A.1: Deﬁnitions and Sources of Data (sample period: 1964 Q.1 - 2004 Q.1
Name Deﬁnition Source
Civilian non- Civilian non-institutional population 16 years of age and Economagic, Fed.
institutional pop. above of St. Louis
Output Gross Domestic Product in chained year 2000 prices Economagic, Fed.
divided by civilian non-institutional population of St. Louis
Consumption Personal Consumption Expenditure in chained year Economagic, Fed.
2000 prices divided by civilian non-institutional population of St. Louis
Total hours Non-farm hours divided by civilian non-institutional DRI database
population
Unemployment Total unemployment divided by civilian non-institutional Economagic, Fed.
population of St. Louis
Vacancies Index of help wanted advertising in newspapers divided Economagic, Fed.
by civilian non-institutional population of St. Louis
VU-ratio Vacancies divided by unemployment -
Unemployment Civilians unemployed 15 weeks and above divided by Economagic, Fed.
> 15 weeks civilian non-institutional population of St. Louis
Participation Sum of civilian employment and unemployment divided Economagic, Fed.
rate by civilian non-institutional population of St. Louis
27Table 1. US Business Cycle Statistics, 1964-2004
HP-ﬁltered Data
Variable Standard deviation Correlations with
(percent) output consumption
Output 1.56 1 -
Consumption 1.23 0.87 -
Total hours 1.75 0.91 -
Unemployment 10.81 -0.87 -0.71
Vacancies 13.18 0.91 0.81
vu−ratio 23.66 0.90 0.77
Ratio of vacancies
to unempl>15 weeks 34.71 0.85 0.68
Participation rate 0.31 0.45 0.27
BK-ﬁltered Data
Variable Standard deviation Correlations with
output consumption
Output 1.51 1 -
Consumption 1.22 0.89 -
Total Hours 1.77 0.88 -
Unemployment 10.97 -0.89 -0.73
Vacancies 13.15 0.93 0.81
vu−ratio 23.85 0.92 0.78
Ratio of vacancies
to unempl.>15 weeks 35.52 0.87 0.70
Participation rate 0.28 0.48 0.29






































































IES = 1 IES = 1/10 Linear (IES = 1) Linear (IES = 1/10)
This ﬁgure illustrates the actual US unemployment level with the unemployment level implied
by Theorem 1. The diamonds (squares) illustrate the relationship when assuming that
η =1( η =1 0 ) . The linear regression lines show that there is a negative relationship
between the actual and predicted unemployment levels.



































LHS eq. 42 US Data Active Search Only
Note: The full drawn line illustrates the percentage standard deviation of HP-ﬁltered values of the
left hand side of equation (42) for alternative values of the share of total matches due to “passive
search” (Mu/M). The mean value of Mu/M in US data is around 40 percent. The model of
Section 2 of the paper assumes that Mu/M is equal to 1.



















































































































































Note: The graph illustrates the civilian non-institutional labor force as a share of the
civilian non-institutional population of age 16 and above. The shaded areas are recessions
as deﬁned by the NBER dating committee.


























































































































































































































































































































































































The top panel illustrates percentage deviations from an HP-trend of the VU-ratio (left scale) and of
labor market participation (right scale)
34Appendix 1. Derivation of the results for the model with variable search
eﬀort
In this model, the households’ problem is given as:




1−η/(1 − η)+nH (1 − l − s)+uH (1 − s)







0 ≤ (1 − δ + r)k + wnl + π − ud(h)
n
0 =( 1 − σ)n + γ
huh
We let λc denote the multiplier on the ﬁrst constraint and λn the multiplier on












k : Jk (k,n)=λc (1 − δ + r)
u : H (1) − H (1 − s)=γ
hλnh − γd(h)λc
n
0 : λn = βEJn0 (k
0,n
0)
n : Jn (k,n)=λcwl +( 1− σ)λn + H (1 − l − s) − H (1)








which is equation (29) in the text.
Next, combining the conditions for u, c,a n dh implies that:
H (1) − H (1 − s)=γ
hλnh + d(h)c
−η ⇒
H (1) − H (1 − s)=c
−ηγd(h)[ψ(h) − 1]
which is equation (30) in the text. The ﬁrms’ problem is unchanged relative to the
basic model. The Nash wage bargaining therefore implies that:
ϑJn = c
−η (1 − ϑ)Qn
where:
Jn (k,n)=λcwl + H (1 − l − s) − H (1) + (1 − σ)βEJn0 (k
0,n
0)






















H (1) − H (1 − s)+γd(h)c−η
γhh
Therefore, it follows that:
ϑ















which corresponds to equation (31).
Appendix 2: Homework
The ﬁrms’ problem is again unchanged so we concentrate on the households’
problem. It can be formulated as:




1−η/(1 − η)+nH (1 − l − s − μw)+uH (1 − s − μu)







0 ≤ (1 − δ + rx)k + wnl + π
n




(1 − x)k,nμn + uμu +( 1− n − u)μl,z
h¢
We denote the multipliers on these restrictions (in that order) by λ1, λ2 and λ3.

















(μu − μl)=H (1 − μl) − H (1 − s − μu)
μn : nH









μl :( 1 − n − u)H
0 (1 − μl)=λ3
∂g
∂μ
(1 − n − u)





0 : λ2 = βEJn0 (k
0,n
0)








The ﬁrst-order conditions for μn, μu and μl immediately imply that:
μl = μu + s = μn + l + s
since:
H
0 (1 − l − s − μn)=H
0 (1 − s − μu)=H
0 (1 − μl)
Turn now to the wage-bargaining. We have that:
ϑJn (k,n)=λ1 (1 − ϑ)Qn (n)
where:
Jn (k,n)=λ1wl + λ3
∂g
∂μ
(μn − μu)+( 1− σ)βEJn0 (k
0,n
0)




















∂μ (μl − μu)
γh


















∂μ (μl − μu)















We now use the Cobb-Douglas assumptions and the result from above that rl −














which can be re-arranged to give us equation (38) :
θ =
cm
μ
ϑ
1 − ϑ
1 − ξ
ξ
(1 − τ)
s
κ
38